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Abstract:  In this paper we study alliances between banks and insurance 
companies.  Firstly, we characterize the driving forces behind financial 
alliances and networking trends.  Then we give an overview of relevant 
previous research. We define six different structure models for financial 
alliances.  The parameters of the models are the closeness of the 
alliance in terms of mutual ownership, and the question whether or not  
alliance partners have overlapping service channels.  Examples of the 
models are given in the Finnish bank and insurance market. 
 
Next, we characterize nine criteria according to which the previously 
defined models are to be compared to achieve the most attractive 
alliance model.  Thus, we obtain a multi-criteria decision making 
(MCDM) problem. In the design of the criteria representatives of the top 
management of Finnish banks and insurance companies have been 
consulted.  We conclude with some ideas for further research, especially to 
solve the present MCDM problem. 
 
Keywords: Financial alliances, financial convergence, financial 
conglomerates, multi-criteria decision making, strategic planning 
 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Networking and alliance formation have been growing trends among the 
financial industry during the last decades.  In many European countries it 
became almost an industrial practice in the late eighties to step over the 
borderline between banks and insurance companies.  It was often a bank 
which had calculated that it would produce good synergies to start up an 
insurance subsidiary, or perhaps both a life and a nonlife subsidiary, and 
then sell their products via the bank's own distribution network.  In the 
nineties big financial conglomerates which include both banks and 
insurance companies emerged both in USA and Europe.  
                                  
Launching financial conglomerates was generally based on the same 
hypothesis as intra-sector mergers: centralized ownership helps to achieve 
and utilize the critical mass and, thus, increase efficiency.  It was also 
believed that different business lines could diversify the business portfolio 
and equalize business cycles.  There are many firm supporters of financial 
conglomerates but as we have entered the new millennium we have also 
heard their opponents' statements.  The diversification potential has both in 
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theory and practice been questioned.  The different attitude to risk in the 
banking and the insurance industries has worried some observers 
especially in the insurance sector.  On the other hand, because of the 
obvious benefits of cross-selling some kind of alliance between banks and 
insurance companies should be desirable.  Therefore, one can ask what is 
the most appropriate depth of an alliance given the financial institution's 
business objectives.     
                               
The term "financial alliance" occurs seldom in the literature - when authors 
refer to groupings which are looser than conglomerates they often use the 
term "financial convergenge" (see section 2).  The scientific dialogue in this 
field is both scarce and rather pragmatic, and systematic approaches to 
selecting the best alliance model can hardly be found.  
            
In the following we use the term, "financial alliance" to stand for an alliance 
between one or several banks and one or several insurance companies.  
The insurers in an alliance can be life and/or nonlife companies.  Alliances 
between banks and nonlife insurance companies with no life counterparts 
are in practice rare.  On the other hand, synergies between retail banking 
and life insurance are so significant that one often encounters alliances 
between banks and life insurers without nonlife counterparts. 
                              
Financial alliances often include units like mutual fund managing 
companies, asset management companies, securities brokerages and 
corporate finance companies, but for the sake of simplicity we restrict 
ourselves in this paper to the groups of banks and insurance companies.  
(In most European countries banks are allowed to be “universal”.  
Consequently, it is customary that they include the above mentioned 
functions.  The same holds more and more often for insurance 
companies.) 
 
 The driving forces behind the alliance or networking trend are, for example: 
 
-    narrowing profit margins in banks and insurance companies call for new     
 sources of income by cross-selling ; 
-    tight margins can also necessitate savings and cut-off programs which can 
 be more effectively carried out by closer alliance structure ; 
-  changing customer behaviour such as one-stop shopping requires co-  
 operation between all financial service providers ; 
-    international trade agreements are dismantling tariffs and breaking down  
 barriers to trade allowing more companies to enter new markets (Ryan 
 [2001]) ; 
- Regulators are espousing greater competition because they are 
recognizing the economic benefits to their countries and their customers 
(Ryan [2001]) ; 
- cross-selling can play, and has played an important role in preventing job 
losses and creating employment in the banking sector (Benoist [2002]). 
 
The aspect in this paper is managerial.  Another two possible aspects 
would be supervisory, although there are common factors in these 
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perspectives, and a customer's.  We also concentrate on the retail market 
although alliance formation also has significance in relation to other 
customer segments.   
 
 
 2   Overview on previous research 
 
Focarelli and Pozzolo [2001] point out that during the nineties the number 
and value of mergers and acquisitions increased rapidly in virtually all 
sectors of economic activity.  They have been particularly frequent in the 
banking sector, thanks to widespread deregulation, which permitted the 
integration of financial activities such as banking, asset management, and 
insurance.  Vander Vennet [2002] shows that financial conglomerates are 
more revenue efficient than their specialized competitors.  His results 
indicate that the current trend toward further de-specialization may lead to 
a more efficient banking system.   
 
Financial convergence.  The emergence of alliances is connected to the 
financial convergence, which means blurring of conventional boundaries of 
once discrete financial sectors (Ryan [2001]).  Converging sectors are 
assuming each other's tasks.  A good example is the credit insurance 
which can be used as a credit security instead of a bank guarantee.  
Convergence is driven by a need for growth by entering new markets, and 
by the desire to maximize share of wallet from every customer (Ryan 
[2001]).  Van den Berghe and Verweire [2001] point out that one or another 
form of the financial convergence can be witnessed in many, if not all, 
developed markets.   Much attention has been given to the convergence in 
the retail market, but there is a growing convergence trend in the US 
financial markets involving commercial insurance companies, reinsurance 
companies and leading investment banks. 
 
Supervisory perspective.  We comment on research concerning 
supervisory aspects of convergence only very briefly here.  Convergence 
has brought about somewhat similar solvency regulation for the banking 
and insurance sectors. Bittermann [2003] compares banking and insurance 
risks and points out that in Germany, for example,  the convergence of the 
financial sectors has resulted in merging the respective supervisory 
authorities.  On the other hand, Manghetti [2002] comes to the conclusion 
that supervising even multinational financial conglomerates does not 
necessitate the convergence of supervisory authorities.  OECD [1998] 
gives three alternative approaches of regulatory requirement and capital 
adequacy of converged financial institutions.  Also Van der Berghe and 
Verweire [2001] discuss implications of financial convergence for 
supervision and regulation.  Verweire [1999] shows that the risk profile of 
financial conglomerates is better than that of specialized suppliers 
(specialized banks and specialized insurance companies). 
 
Shareholder aspects.  Cybo-Ottone and Murgia [2000] study whether 
European cross-product mergers have created positive shareholder value.  
They document positive results driven by the strong market reaction of 
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deals announced between banks and insurance companies.  Those 
mergers show very high cumulative abnormal returns.  Cybo-Ottone and 
Murgia explain this by economies of scope or revenue efficiencies due to 
cross-selling of bank and insurance products to retail customers.  In USA, 
The Citicorp-Travelers Group merger in 1998 increased the prospects for 
new legislation to remove the barriers between banking and insurance, 
resulting in a positive wealth effect for institutions most likely to gain from 
deregulation.  Carow [2001] proves that at the time of the merger investors 
expected large banks and insurance companies to receive significant 
benefits from congressional legislation removing barriers to bancassurance 
(consolidation).  Later on the new Citygroup has been expected to divest its 
non-core business areas. 
 
Diversification.  Boyd et al. [1993] used hypothetical cross-product mergers 
and simulations and found risk reduction effects from these deals.  Boyd 
and Graham [1988] found that life insurance companies seem to offer good 
prospects as matches for bank-holding companies because of potential 
diversification gains.  See also Lown et al. [2000] and Ladermann [1999].   
 
Estrella [2001] examines direct measures of potential diversification gains 
from consolidation of financial firms.  His results indicate that there may be 
bilateral diversification gains from mergers involving the banking and 
insurance industries.  Estrella points out that these gains are not limited to 
life insurance as suggested by the previous authors, but extend to nonlife 
insurance companies, which actually lead to larger diversification gains 
than with life insurance companies.  He also shows that life insurance and 
nonlife insurance have relatively large correlations with regard to each 
other, but also with regard to large banks.  One of the main reasons that 
banking-insurance combinations enhance diversification is not lack of 
commonality, but that the insurance industries are already highly diversified 
compared to other financial sectors. 
 
The emergence of alliances has also influenced finance product sales: 
according to SIGMA [2003], growing sales of life insurance in banks has 
increased, especially unit-linked sales volumes. 
 
 
3   Structure models for financial alliances 
 
      As we described in section 2, the existing literature on financial alliances is                  
      strongly concentrated around alliances created by cross-sector ownership.      
      The objective of this work is to find out if ownership really is superior to  
      looser alliance models.   
                    
Alliance structures can be classified in three categories according to the 
degree of closeness of the members.  The categories in the increasing 
order of closeness are  
 
- Cross-selling agreements.  The parties agree to sell each other's 
products to their own customers.  (One can alternatively cross-sell by 
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selling one's own products to the other party's customers.  This can be 
recommended if the products are complicated.  This type of cross-selling is 
often made more effective so that one party gives with the customer’s 
permission his/her contact information to the other party for marketing their 
products.)  The cross-selling is frequently one-sided.  Then most often a 
bank sells an insurance company's products to its customers.  Life 
insurance products, especially, depending on the tax system, can bring 
immediate added value to a retail bank's customer service process and 
they can be sold effectively by the bank sales force (cf. for example Van 
den Berghe and Verweire [2001], Benoist [2002]).  Similar advantages for 
insurance companies are not so obvious.  Generale and Gobbi [1999] 
show that the most efficient banks in developed countries earn a smaller 
percentage of their profits from traditional activities and a larger share from 
off-balance-sheet operations (like life insurance and mutual fund sales). 
 
 This alliance category can still be divided to two subcategories depending 
on whether the parties' service channels are overlapping or not.  Here a 
service channel can be a branch office network, but also a call center or 
website etc.  Especially in the case of overlapping branch networks one 
easily faces channel conflict: the alliance members do not co-operate 
effectively, due to the fear of losing their customers to the other party and 
consequently such items as sales provisions.  Non-overlapping  service 
channels often means that the other party has no service channel at all - it 
functions as a product provider and uses its associates' sales force(s) to 
reach its customers. 
 
- Alliance of independent partners.  This alliance type is a special case 
of a cross-selling agreement where the alliance is tightened by cross-
ownership and/or joint ownership in third parties.  Cross-ownership means 
a minority stake of the other party's shares. If the ownership were one-
sided, it would probably be a sign of asymmetry and one party's dominance 
of the alliance. An example of joint ownership is a mutual fund 
management company owned jointly by a bank, or banks, and an 
insurance company, or insurance companies.  One could also think about 
cross-ownership/joint ownership without a cross-selling agreement, but 
such a model seldom occurs in practice. 
 
- Control by ownership.  A weakness in both the previous models is that it 
can be difficult to satisfy each alliance member with respect to the division 
of earnings and costs. This can be avoided by concentrating all the control 
in one of the alliance members.  (This is called "bancassurance" if a bank 
has taken control.  The opposite model "assurfinance" is not considered to 
be so effective.  Van den Berghe and Verweire [2001] claim that the only 
succesful route in this respect is buying an existing bank instead of 
establishing one from scratch.  Benoist [2002] comments assurfinance in 
further detail.)  There are two ways of implementing control by ownership: a 
bank can simply own (a control of) an insurance company or vice versa.   In 
a more sophisticated ownership model a holding company owns a number 
of banks and insurance companies.  It is for this structure that we use the  
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 term "financial conglomerate".  This is a result of a cross-segment 
consolidation.  Recently consolidation has also been happening across 
countries ("cross-geography consolidation"). 
 
An example of a financial conglomerate which offers its customers a large 
portfolio of financial services is Citigroup (Carow [2001], Ryan [2001]).  
Some firms, like ING, have chosen to specialize in just a few select 
services (Ryan [2001], Kist [2001]).  Kist [2001] points out that the premise 
for creating such conglomerates is to create value for all stakeholders, i.e. 
shareholders, employees, and, most important, their clients.  He also 
defines an integrated financial services company (IFS) as an organization 
that provides insurance, banking, and asset management products to its 
customers through a variety of distribution channels.  IFS can be 
understood as a well-integrated financial conglomerate.  It has the unique 
ability to develop tailor-made banking, insurance, and asset management 
products for its customer base (Kist [2001]).  Being a conglomerate 
increases the number of opportunities to diversify.  For instance, it enables 
greater geographic diversification.  For example, the Nordic Swedbank, 
Nordea and Sampo have successfully established themselves in the states 
around the Baltic Sea. 
 
There is quite scarce and only recent literature available concerning 
alliance models.  The division of the models mentioned by Van der Berghe 
and Verweire [2001] is otherwise similar to ours but they do not differentiate 
between overlapping and non-overlapping service channels.  The model 
classification by Benoist [2002] is somewhat different including for example 
franchise agreements and joint ventures which have not been used in the 
Nordic countries. 
 
In Finland there are examples of most of the presented alliance categories: 
The Okobank group, Fennia Insurance group, and the Local Insurance 
group have a cross-selling agreement with overlapping service channels; 
GE Financial Insurance has a one-sided sales agreement with several 
financial institutions with no overlapping service channels; the nonlife 
insurer Pohjola, the life insurer Suomi, and 32 local savings banks have an 
alliance of independent partners with overlapping service channels and 
with joint ownership in a mutual fund management company and a retail 
bank; control by ownership has been adopted by banks like OP Group, 
Handelsbanken and Aktia by establishing or acquiring a life insurance 
company, and by Tapiola Insurance group by establishing a bank; and 
finally, Sampo Group is an example of a financial conglomerate.  See also 
figure 1.  Because there are so many models in real use in Finland, the 
problem of selecting the most attractive model is most relevant. 
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 Control by            Alliance of  Cross-selling              Alliance 
 ownership            independent  agreement                  structures 
            partners                               
 
 
 
 
 
A bank owns                          Non-over-       Over-            Non-over-          Over-                          
an insurance      Financial               lapping           lapping          lapping              lapping   Sub-          
company or       conglomerates       service           service            service               service   struct.                      
vice versa                 channels        channels         channels           channels 
 
Op Group;          Nordea;               Pohjola &          GE &            OP Group & 
Handelsbanken;    Sampo                Suomi & 32       different         Fennia & 
Aktia;                 local savings      financial          Local  
Tapiola                 banks                institutions     Insurance; 
                      Aktia&Veritas 
 
 
Figure 1.  Examples of structure models adopted in Finland. 
 
 
 
4  Criteria for model comparison 
 
The alliance models described in section 3 shall be compared and 
eventually prioritized according to the following criteria. The decision maker 
here is the top management of a financial enterprise which is considering 
various ways to create a financial alliance.  Another possible and 
interesting point of view would be that of a supervisory authority, but we do 
not discuss it here. 
 
The criteria are here understood as objectives which should be optimized.  
They are not necessarily quantitative.  The criteria we suggest here are to  
 
1.   maximize the efficiency of product development, especially the design 
of combination (hybrid) products, 
2.   implement the one-door-principle as effectively as possible, 
3.   compromise possibly conflicting earnings logics as well as possible 
4.   maximize the efficiency of customer relationship management 
5.   optimize cost and revenue synergies 
6.   minimize channel conflicts   
7.   optimize required solvency capital 
8.   maximize investor power 
9.   maximize the efficiency of sales management 
 
Let us take a closer look at these criteria. 
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1.  "Maximize the efficiency of product development". 
Quality of product development is essential for any financial institution, and 
it is useful to be able to control it through co-operating partners.  
Combination products as, for example, a loan and a loan protection 
insurance, or a mortgage loan connected to a mutual fund savings plan, 
are a way of packaging different offerings together and deepening the 
customer relation.  Van der Berghe and Verweire [2001] give an interesting 
view of the future of integrated financial services.  They point out that one 
does not need an integrated group of financial suppliers to offer integrated 
products.  If distribution will be able to offer client-oriented financial services 
from different financial services providers, they might evolve to become 
important players in the financial sector. 
 
Decreasing active age groups and growing old age groups cause a serious 
financing problem for entire national economies.  Nguyen [2003] examines 
the optimal pension model and its influence on individual saving behaviour, 
especially under the influence of an ageing population.  Demange and 
Laroque [2001] study the functioning of social security schemes under 
demographic shocks.  On the micro level, we shall probably witness 
creation of more long-term savings products with tax incentives with which 
individuals can complement mandatory social security systems.  This again 
calls for the successful combination of various financial products.  Benoist 
[2002] points out that in U.K. and Germany the creation of stakeholder 
pensions has increased the potential benefits of mergers and alliances 
between bankers and insurers.  Ryan [2001] anticipates new markets for 
individual pension products and, more generally, products that provide 
financial security in old age. 
 
2.  "Implement the one-door-principle as effectively as possible".   
One-door-principle means that a customer is offered as many bank and 
insurance products as possible at one place during one customer service 
event.  The objective is full customer service at one stop and, thus, again 
packaging different products together and deepening customer relation.  
Benoist [2002] concludes that this makes life easier for clients. Van der 
Berghe and Verweire [2001] discuss one-door-principle and conclude that it 
suits some customers, while others prefer shopping around themselves. 
 
3.  "Compromise possibly conflicting earnings logics as well as possible".  
In an alliance partners have to fit together their earnings logics. From one 
alliance member's point of view control over the other members obviously 
helps to optimize the result. 
 
4.  "Maximize the efficiency of customer relationship management".  
Customer-orientation means for example selecting his/her needs as a basis 
for business generation, and tailoring the service according to the business 
volume generated by the customer.  The customer is given a responsible 
contact person and uniform service through the organization is secured by 
sufficient internal training.  Customer orientation must also show in 
provision structures: the customer does not nowadays accept being 
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forgotten after the sales transaction, and provision structure must reward 
the salesperson for the long-term care of the customer.   According to Ryan 
[2001], most Americans maintain relationships with several different 
financial services providers but recent surveys show that over 50 per cent 
of consumers want to consolidate their financial relationships.  The change 
in insurance customers' behaviour and expectations is discussed for 
example by European Commission [1996], p. 5.  
      
Financial institutions have parallel service channels like physical branch 
networks, various agents, the internet, call centers, mobile devices etc.  
The principle should be that the customer can choose the channel(s) 
he/she wants to use.  Kist [2001] prioritizes an IFS (see section 3) because 
of its ability to have multiple distribution channels that have the means to 
approach customers in a variety of ways, i.e. click, call, and face - as 
defined by Kist.  Integrating various channels and inter-channel customer 
information transfer are challenges for a financial institution even without 
any alliance structure.  More generally, customer relationship management 
(CRM) requires significant IT investments and continuous development.  
See also Kist [2001] for customer value management.  A theoretical 
approach to CRM in insurance is given by Schäfer [2000]. 
 
5.  "Optimize cost and revenue synergies".  
Scale benefits are obvious in the production of many financial products.  
They have traditionally been utilized by means of consolidation within the 
banking/insurance sectors.  Cross-sector utilization evidently requires 
consolidation, too.  According to Kist [2001], some ways to gain maximum 
advantage with an IFS (see section 3) are to integrate risk management 
activities across the group, develop consistent financial reporting 
performance measures across all business types, and implement shared 
services for technology, accounting, and human resources.  A great source 
of synergy is the ability to combine the previously separate asset 
management functions across the company into a single management 
structure. 
  
Among other reasons, changing customer behaviour tends to make it 
necessary to reduce service channels, most of all branch networks.  
Eliminating overcapacity is at least in principle a more straightforward 
action when one member of the alliance has control over the others.  On 
the other hand, integration creates overlapping functions which have to be 
streamlined.  In the case of looser alliances one-door-principle makes it 
possible to get rid of branch overload.  For other cost and revenue 
synergies, see Kist [2001]. 
  
6.  "Minimize channel conflicts". 
A channel conflict can occur when the channels of alliance partners cross-
sell each other's products to the same customers.  Then the branch staff 
may think that the other party is stealing their provisions by cross-selling 
"their" product to their customer.  Sometimes an alliance member can fear 
that when they have cross-sold a customer their partner's product, the 
partner uses the acquired customer information when selling him/her 
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another product competing with the original company's products.  Channel 
conflict may also lead to fragmentation of the client base and/or ring-
fencing of product offers (offers labelled "bank" or "insurance", see Benoist 
[2002]). 
  
7.  "Optimize required solvency capital". 
The return on equity (ROE) is one of the most important performance 
measures in financial enterprises.  Therefore, company management must 
carefully optimize the relation between working capital and balance sheet.  
In Finland, this ratio is on the average ca. 10 % which means that the 
Finnish life insurance companies have the capital of two billion euros on top 
of the technical reserves.  (Schroeder et al. [2001] show that unit-link 
insurance has improved profit margins compared with with-profits life 
insurance in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium.  One 
important reason is lower working capital requirement.  Trapp [2003] calls 
for new business models for weakly capitalized insurance companies.)   
 
Traditionally, one important incentive for mergers and acquisitons is 
diversification of business portfolio.  In principle, a financial conglomerate 
has greater flexibility and greater opportunity for diversification than a 
simple combination (Kist [2001]).  If there are several consolidated banks 
and  insurance companies under the same control, it is crucial whether or 
not the different companies equalize or amplify each other's business 
cycles.  In the latter case a group may be forced to complement its 
solvency capital as the bottom of the cycle approaches.  This has caused 
serious discussion of the justification of cross-sector consolidation in many 
parts of Europe.  It seems from practical experience that the business 
cycles of traditional (with-profits) life insurance and retail banking correlate 
strongly, but nonlife/risk life insurance and retail banking are less correlated 
(cf. Kist [2001], Kwan and Laderman [1999], Laderman [1999]). 
 
Consolidated financial groups must have strong risk management 
capabilities.  Information concerning risks can be used to determine the 
required levels of economic capital within each business unit and at the 
group level (Kist [2001]).  Also, the succesful leveraging of risk 
management professionals between the banking and insurance businesses 
can create much synergy.  Furthermore, banks and insurance companies 
can provide each other a partial hedge of their natural asset liabilities 
mismatch positions. 
  
8.  "Maximize investor power". 
If two companies are consolidated, the investor power is often more than 
doubled because certain fixed minority limits may be exceeded.  For this 
reason, consolidated structures may be favoured because conflicting 
interests of independent partners might prevent them from utilizing this 
phenomenon in practice.  Besides direct share ownership, also 
discretionary asset management and mutual fund management mandates 
give investor power. 
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9. "Maximize the efficiency of sales management". 
Centralized sales management obviously requires centralized 
organizational structure, i.e. consolidation.  One might presume that this is 
a benefit compared to the decentralized management of looser alliances.  
However, some partners with a plain cross-selling agreement claim that 
they have succeeded in creating a very effective "cross-selling culture".
  
 
When we evaluate the attractiveness of the various alliance structures 
presented in section 3 in the light of the above nine criteria, we wish to 
point out that : 
 
• Although the literature seems to favour financial conglomerates, it is by 
no means granted that they are optimal in all circumstances. 
• Even if control by ownership should be preferred, it may be found to be  
difficult or impossible to implement.  That is the case for example for 
many local banks and mutual insurance companies. 
• It is certainly more attractive to control than to be controlled.  In case of 
financial conglomeration the solution for the owners of a company to be 
acquired can be accepting shares of the acquiring company as the 
purchase price. 
 
 
5 Expert interviews     
       
We have interviewed the experts listed in section 7 and asked about their 
opinions on the alliance structure models and the criteria explained in 
sections 3 and 4. 
 
One of the major benefits of tighter alliance models is that for example 
“control by ownership” prevents or at least strongly restricts channel 
conflicts.  Some experts pointed out, however, that well written sales 
agreements minimize, if not totally prevent channel conflicts.  Furthermore, 
protecting customer relations and fundamental business lines were 
considered more important than immediate returns.   
 
It was generally acknowledged that the presented six models succeed in 
separating various real-life alliances quite well, at least in the Finnish 
market.  In fact, as recently as last November there would have been 
Finnish examples in every category. 
 
Several experts paid attention to the top management point of view in the 
MCDM problem.  Some of them asked whether this is somehow different 
from the shareholder’s perspective.  If the top management incentives are 
appropriate and good corporate governance is also otherwise followed, 
there is hardly significant difference.  The situation may change if a 
shareholder has important holdings in several financial enterprises. 
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One expert remarked that the second criterion could be stated in a more 
general way, for example “create as effective sales channels as possible”. 
However, the author has noticed, while planning several financial alliances 
in recent years, that one-door-principle has always been among the 
objectives.  The suggested generalization is actually a part of the ninth 
criterion. 
 
An expert suggested a more descriptive name for the third criterion : 
“ensure as fair division of earnings and costs as possible”. 
 
The fourth criterion could, according to an expert, be defined as “enable 
effective cross-selling”. 
 
As already pointed out in section 4, channel conflicts should be understood 
so widely that they include conflicts between product companies.  An 
expert suggested, with good reasons, that the sixth criterion should be 
called “minimize interest conflicts between service channels and between 
product companies”.  Channel conflicts may occur also in financial 
conglomerates.  For example, savings insurance and deposits compete for 
the same customers.  This problem can be solved by good steering 
systems.  For instance, salespersons should get sufficient reward for 
selling other business units’ products and creating succesful contacts 
between their customers and other business units.  Thus, they become 
“group salespersons”. 
 
The seventh criterion actually includes a whole MCDM problem, the most 
important objective of which could be “maximize ROI”.  Here the time 
horizon is crucial.  If solvency requirements for certain business lines are 
relatively lower than for other lines, there is a possibility for arbitrage. 
 
The eighth criterion was given a minimal weight by some experts, while 
others remarked that even if institutional investors in Finland not so often 
participate in board working, they use their power in annual shareholders’ 
meetings.   It is also becoming more common that they participate in board 
and compensation committee working.  Finnish life insurance companies 
have, at least so far, been more active investors than, for example, fund 
management companies. 
 
One of the experts suggested an additional tenth criterion: “Optimize the 
stable competitive position”  Because many criteria already represent 
various aspects of this criterion, we decided no to add it.  Another 
suggestion for a new criterion was “minimize the (negative) effects of the 
changes in operational environment”.  We did not accept this criterion to 
our list, either, because it is not very concrete and, again, existing criteria 
cover several aspects of it. 
 
One expert wanted to point out that now that we have, in a sense, nine 
objective functions, we should keep in mind the restrictions, i.e. licence 
regulations and minimum solvency requirements. 
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To summarize the interviews : The criteria are, obviously, partially over-
lapping, but no criterion covers totally another criterion.  Therefore, there is 
no need to “merge” criteria.  Inserting new criteria did not seem useful, 
either.  Financial conglomerates may suffer from intrigues and sub-
optimization, but these phenomena can be done away with by a competent 
management.  One of the experts remarked that in other alliance models 
than “control by ownership” much better sales results can be achieved if 
there are other partners’ sales experts in the top management of each 
company.  Finally, people are decisive, not only the model.  
 
   
6 Conclusion 
 
We have achieved an MCDM problem and are definitely interested to solve 
it.  The question is how to rank the models in section 3 according to the 
criteria in section 4 considering that the criteria are difficult to quantify and 
measure in a harmonious way.  One possible solution method is the 
analytic hierarchy process (AHP) by Saaty ([1980], [1990]).  With the help 
of AHP we can compare the criteria pairwise and thereby prioritize them.  
We can also compare the models with respect to each criterion and finally 
prioritize the models.  Pairwise comparison allows the use of both 
quantitative and qualitative criteria and the consideration of "soft" values.  
AHP has the added advantage that it allows the decision maker to monitor 
and control the inconsistency of judgements which is inevitable due to 
pairwise comparisons.  
 
We plan to use AHP in an experts' meeting where the experts mentioned in 
the following section negotiate to reach consensus concerning the pairwise 
comparisons.  The experts are top managers of Finnish banks and 
insurance companies which have implemented four out of six alliance 
models which we discuss in section 3. 
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